"constitute fighting words, or a clear and present danger . . . ."
5 Thus, attempts have been made to restrict speech that is seen as offensive to religion or religious sentiments. 6 This is not the first time that publication of media that is critical of Islam has sparked controversy. 7 Several years ago, the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten led to massive worldwide protests, violent attacks, and a large number of casualties. 8 More recently, the release of Innocence of Muslims, 9 a trailer critical of the Prophet Muhammad, sparked riots and demonstrations in countless cities in Africa and the Middle East. 10 The trailer may also have played some role in the infamous attacks on the U.S. compound in Benghazi, which resulted in the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens. 11 As a response to protests and violence over the Innocence of Muslims video, senior Obama Administration Officials such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged YouTube to remove the videos in certain countries, which further sparked debate about the extent of freedom of speech and whether such cartoons should be permitted. , http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/11/adherents-of-islamsecond-largest-religion-in-the-world-are-a-powerless-disenfranchised-minority/ ("I would have thought that one of the most prominent and (at least in the distant past) iconoclastic cartoonists in the world, receiving an award for his lifetime achievement as a cartoonist, would have explained in a bit more detail just which sorts of ideologies should now be immunized from ridicule, and which sort of cartoons should indeed be criminalized or at least condemned by the cartooning elites."); see also David Frum, Why Garry Trudeau Is Wrong About Charlie Hebdo, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/why-garry-trudeau-is-wrong-about-charliehebdo/390336/. 6 For instance, Missouri enacted a law in 2012 that outlawed profane behavior near a house of worship, which was struck down by the Eighth Circuit. MO (Mar. 9, 2015) , http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/03/09/ban-on-profane-rude-or-indecent-speech-that-disturbs-houses-of-worshipviolates-the-first-amendment/. See generally Elizabeth Crisp, SNAP Sues over Mo. 'House of Worship Protection Act,' ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/snap-sues-over-mo-house-of-worship-protection-act/article_1903f94c-eca5-11e1-8dca-0019bb30f31a.html. 7 More generally, the discussion about the potential for Internet speech to contribute to violence dates back to at least the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 367 (1996) . 8 For extensive discussion of the Danish Muhammad Cartoon controversy, see infra Section I.A. 9 Innocence of Muslims (Kaloula Basseley Nakoula 2012). 10 For more on the Innocence of Muslims controversy, see infra Section I.B. At first glance, the claim that speech can be proscribed not because it is offensive, but because it will engender a violent reaction and harm national security seems more moderate and restrained than an all-out call for hate-speech laws. Yet, ultimately these approaches are two sides of the same coin. Allowing speech to be restricted would allow those offended to shut down speech with which they disagree through the threat of violence, even though the topics of discussion are some of the most pertinent and urgently needed. 17 This Article analyzes why the American government should not be able to proscribe the publication or republication of media, even when there is reason to believe that the publication could potentially lead to violence and civic reprisals against soldiers, diplomats, or citizens. The Article considers the various exemptions to the First Amendment that allow for the government to regulate or restrict certain types of unprotected speech. While there are many similarities between justifications for these limited-speech doctrines and for those preventing provocative speech, such as images of Muhammad, the differences between these groups of thought are even more significant. 18 These differences highlight why it would be unwise to allow the restriction of such provocative speech.
19 A significant example of this contrast is that unprotected, or prohibited, speech is treated as outside the realm of protected speech because it has an intrinsic lack of value. 20 Punishing provocative, but otherwise fully protected speech, solely because of the reaction it engenders, however, imposes speech restrictions purely for extrinsic reasons rather than in response to the value of the speech itself. 21 It is a terrorist's veto to allow those opposed to an idea the ability to suppress its expression through threats of violence. 22 Such a veto would violate the core First Amendment principle that "constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their the images of Jesus Christ that are desecrated, or churches that are destroyed, or the Holocaust that is denied." Id.
As Professor Turley noted, "President Obama's U.N. address last month declaring America's support for free speech, while laudable, seemed confused-even at odds with his administration's efforts." Jonathan Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice: How the Western World Is Limiting Free Speech, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shut-up-and-play-nice-how-the-western-world-is-limitingfree-speech/2012/10/12/e0573bd4-116d-11e2-a16b-2c110031514a_story.html. 17 See Ross Douthat, The Blasphemy We Need, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/the-blasphemy-we-need/; see also Johnathan Chait, Charlie Hebdo and the Right to Commit Blasphemy, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 7, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-and-the-right-to-commit-blasphemy.html. 18 See infra Parts II, III. 19 See infra Parts II, III. 20 See infra Parts II, III. 21 See infra Parts II, III. 22 See infra Part IV. The phrase "terrorist's veto" has been used in the popular press and on blogs in reference to the backlash triggered as a result of the publication of provocative images but has thus far received little attention in legal scholarship. See Part I contrasts three recent controversies over the publication of images of the Prophet Muhammad to illustrate the complex and varied relationship between the publication of provocative images and actual acts of violence. 26 Part II considers prior restraints regarding certain types of speech, and argues that they are especially inappropriate for provocative material. 27 Part III examines a variety of unprotected speech, including fighting words, incitement, true threats, and material support for terrorism, in order to illustrate why provocative speech is fully protected speech and any efforts to restrict it would fail strict scrutiny. 28 Part IV elaborates on the concept of a terrorist's veto, and why creating such a veto would be harmful to the marketplace of ideas.
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I. THREE CARTOON CONTROVERSIES AND RECURRING THEMES
This Part focuses on three recent instances where the publication of provocative images of the Prophet Muhammad led to outbreaks of violence: the Danish Cartoon Controversy, the Innocence of Muslims video, and the Charlie Hebdo cartoons. These three controversies have considerable similarities, but also diverge in meaningful ways. Some of the most notable differences include: the intentions of those publishing the cartoons, the spontaneity of acts of violence, who was targeted for violence, the amount of time it took for violence to occur, the degree to which non-violent means proceeded violence, and public reactions to the images. Following the description of the three incidents in Sections A-C, Section D highlights some of their similarities and differences, illustrating themes that will remain relevant throughout the Article.
Of the three controversies, the Danish Cartoon controversy was the earliest. The passage of time has allowed for more extensive analysis, which has revealed complexities that were not immediately apparent at first sight. In particular, Professor Jytte Klausen has published what is likely the definitive account 26 Recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld the right of anti-Muslim evangelical speakers to speak even in light of a hostile and threatening Muslim crowd. The Court concluded that the removal of protesters by police constituted an impermissible heckler's veto. And it "reaffirm[ed] the comprehensive boundaries of the First Amendment's free speech protection, which envelopes all manner of speech, even when that speech is loathsome in its intolerance, designed to cause offense, and, as a result of such offense, arouses violent retaliation." Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 2015). 25 27 Her first-hand research, including interviews on and off the record with key participants, revealed critical and otherwise unavailable information regarding the roots of the controversy and those who attempted to inflame public sentiment regarding the cartoons.
The Innocence of Muslims video and the murder of the editors of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo are still quite recent and a full account of what exactly provoked the reactions against these images still remains to be written, but this Article attempts to paint a thorough picture by relying on newspaper articles and other sources.
A. Danish Cartoon Controversy
On September 30, 2005, Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons that were the result of a solicitation for drawings depicting the Prophet Muhammad from the Denmark's newspaper illustrators. 28 In response to a rumor that illustrators had refused to draw such depictions for a Danish children's book on the Prophet Muhammad, the newspaper hoped to test how many artists would be willing to submit a drawing. 29 Of the forty-two illustrators solicited, only twelve submitted drawings. 30 The newspaper had promised that all the drawings submitted would be published "as a demonstration against intimidation and self-censorship." 31 The cartoons were published alongside an essay by the newspaper's culture and book review Editor, Flemming Rose, which emphasized that the cartoons were being published in opposition to both self-censorship and greater political correctness.
32 Carsten Juste, the newspaper's editor in chief, later stressed that if he had been aware of the extent of the backlash to the cartoons, he never would have allowed them to be published.
33
The cartoons themselves varied in content and in level of offensiveness to Islamic sentiments. 34 fundamentalists who use Islam to justify atrocities. 36 The most iconic of the images was drawn by cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, who depicted "the Prophet with a bomb in his turban." 37 Westergaard stated that he intended his drawing to show how radical Muslims distort the message of Muhammad rather than to attack the Islamic faith. 38 Another one of the cartoonists emphasized that he simply sought to subject Islam to the same kind of criticism to which he had subjected other figures, saying, "I have teased the Pope and Bush, so I thought I could tease Muslims, too." 39 The initial reaction to the publication of the cartoons was tepid, with a variety of local Danish newspapers leveling criticism at Jyllands-Posten for bashing Muslims. 40 The publication of the cartoons was also seen in Denmark as an extension of a local debate over the influence of a few radical mullahs who had been subject to extensive criticism by the newspaper. 41 This local context was lost once the cartoons spread. Ironically, these same Danish mullahs played an extremely active role in provoking international criticism of the cartoons, while at the same time relying on their right to freedom of speech to defend making controversial sermons.
42
Within a couple of weeks of the publication of the cartoons, an international backlash began against the cartoons and against Denmark. The cartoons had fit perfectly into an existing narrative building in several Muslim countries that Denmark had allowed for the expression of speech which was hateful to Islam. 43 In early October, eleven ambassadors of Muslim countries sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Denmark regarding the cartoons, as well as other incidents that were viewed as part of an "ongoing smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims." 44 When the Danish Government did not respond, resolutions against the cartoons were passed and a boycott movement started. 45 At first, the efforts were all nonviolent: peaceful protests occurred in Copenhagen, 46 letters to the editor were penned, and community groups organized to raise awareness of anti-Islamic sentiment. 47 Indeed, these peaceful protests were successful in ultimately leading to an apology by the Danish 36 At least two of the cartoons mocked the contest as a publicity stunt or reactionary. Another used imagery critical of Islam but did not feature an image of the Prophet. And at least one was an illustration of Muhammad but not critical at all. See Martin Asser, What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray, BBC NEWS, (January 2, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4693292.stm. 37 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 21-22. 38 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 22 (arguing that this understanding would have been clear to Danish readers who would see the cartoon in light of the existing norm of anticlerical sentiment, but that it would have been foreign to an international audience). 39 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 25. 40 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 17. 41 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 27-29. 42 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 27-28. Likewise, given the newspaper's strong defense of freedom of expression it is ironic that the newspaper later attempted to use lawsuits to silence critics of its decision to publish the cartoons. See generally id. at 34 (discussing the newspaper's two attempts "to use legal means to stop critics"). 43 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28 at 35. 44 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 36. 45 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 35, 37. 46 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 83. 47 See KLAUSEN, supra note 28. at 43. Those protesting also raised legitimate concerns, such as the fact that Denmark has a law against Holocaust denial, but not one protecting against anti-Islamic speech. See id. at 88.
Prime Minister, 48 as well as from the editor in chief of Jyllands-Posten. 49 Nevertheless, even in the early nonviolent phases of the controversy, there were death threats against the newspaper employees and several of the cartoonists. 50 Yet, there were individuals who sought to benefit from igniting even larger protests. Klausen concludes that the increasing radicalization of protests was the result of a "deliberate, albeit uncoordinated, escalation." 51 In particular, certain Danish imams sough to capitalize on the cartoons. 52 They visited Cairo and Beirut with a dossier of antiIslamic cartoons, some of which were far more inflammatory than the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. 53 This collection of cartoons helped to spur outrage on the part of more radical actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and even years later Middle Eastern leaders did not know which cartoons had actually been published in the Danish newspaper. 54 The imams also appeared on Arab-language television stations sharply criticizing the cartoons. 55 As a result, in early 2006 the protests began turning violent. 56 In February, influential Muslim Brotherhood leader al-Qaradawi "delivered a fiery sermon" calling for a "day of rage," which spurred on violence. 57 The scale and destructive potential of protests increased: in Lebanon, Hezbollah's leader provoked a crowd of 500,000 individuals gathered for the commemoration of the Shiite holiday Ashura into opposition to the cartoons. 58 At its peak, the protestors destroyed embassies and killed scores of individuals. 59 In one day of protesting in Nigeria alone, forty-five people were killed and 185 were injured as a result of the protests.
60
The protests evolved far beyond opposition to the particular cartoons. For example, American businesses were targeted even though the U.S. government had publically condemned the cartoons.
61 Al Queda also co-opted the cartoons as part of its antiWestern message. 62 Likewise, local Islamic leaders continued to encourage protests, many motivated not by opposition to the cartoons, but by a desire to galvanize popular anger against local governments.
63
The aims of the protesters varied markedly. It is likely that some had never even seen the cartoons. 64 Some drew distinctions between cartoons that depicted Muhammad positively and those that depicted him negatively, while others sought to prohibit all Some Muslims instead spoke out against the protests and the violence, encouraging peaceful and polite protest instead. 67 The publication of the cartoons also sparked extensive discussion in the media and elsewhere as to the propriety in general of published images likely to be highly offensive. 68 While many European newspapers republished the cartoons in solidarity, many others criticized the cartoons and refused to republish them. 69 In the United States, in particular, few newspapers decided to reprint the controversial cartoons. 70 International republication, despite its rarity, played a critical role in escalating the conflict. 71 Klausen argues that even though almost none of those protesting in Islamic countries had first heard about the cartoons from the internet, 72 the internet and new media was "a causal factor" in the explosion of the controversy. 73 Those opposing the cartoons used the internet and mobile technology to share the images and galvanize protests. 74 The mobs themselves were often summoned by anonymous text messages and mobile phone calls. 75 Looking at this history of the Danish cartoons, it is clear that events escalated as a result of efforts on the part of extremist groups to provoke backlash. While the initial reaction was a thoughtful debate and non-violent protest, individuals co-opted the protests and turned them into an opportunity for personal or political gain. Years after their publication, "[t]he cartoons became a standard reference for real and perceived conflict over what you 'can say' about Muslims." 76 Remarks about Islam that took place even after the cartoon controversy had died down, such as Pope Benedict's remarks that Islam is "a faith spread by the sword," were "linked to the cartoons by both the European media and . . . Muslims." 77 As such, the cartoons became a weapon wielded by Muslims to attack speech critical of their faith, regardless of how offensive or provocative those criticisms were intended to be. Later, self-censorship regarding the publication of images of the Prophet Muhammad continued to be rampant, an example of which was Comedy Central's decision to censor an episode of the provocative comedy show South Park that depicted Muhammad. 78 Indeed, Comedy Central went so far as to bleep out even usage of the name "Muhammad" in order to avoid provoking a violent backlash. 79 This censorship was in place even though the show had included a depiction of Muhammad in 2001 without incident. 80 Thus, radical groups stoked the flames of controversy and used violent responses to impose censorship.
B. Innocence of Muslims
The origins of the Innocence of Muslims video are still shrouded in some mystery. It was likely written by filmmaker Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, a Coptic Christian strongly opposed to Islam, in consultation with other individuals who are strongly antiIslam. 81 Those cast for the film were told that the movie was to be an epic about a tribal leader. 82 The filmmaker later dubbed in dialogue that references Muhammad. 83 The fourteen-minute trailer, which was posted on YouTube and spread across the globe, depicts a highly critical and questionable account of the origin of Islam. 84 An example of this is the trailer's portrayal of Muhammad as a murderer and pedophile. 85 Unlike the Danish cartoonists who sought to spark a dialogue about freedom of speech, Nakoula seems to have attempted to be especially provocative through the release of the film; for instance, he used the pseudonym Sam Bacile, 86 89 The filmmaker made it clear that he "has no regrets," and promised that he would continue to produce films and books critical of Islam.
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The trailer was posted on YouTube in July 2012 but did not attract attention until an Arabic-language version also appeared on YouTube several months later. 91 Coptic Christian activists promoted the video, seeking to draw attention to the film. 92 On September 8, 2012, a Muslim television program in Egypt aired the video, after which the trailer began to spread rapidly in the region. 93 The video "led to protests across the globe," including in Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. 94 It is likely that the film also played some role, albeit a contested one, in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi in 2012. 95 Just as with the Danish cartoons, some of the protests may have been instigated by political groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood. 96 It is estimated that twenty-eight people were killed as a result of the violence involved in the protests against the film.
97 Cast members and others involved in the film also received death threats, and one Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa calling for the death of everyone involved in the film. 98 To date, however, there has been no noted violence against anyone involved in the making of the film. Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law, has suggested that Nakoula knowingly risked Islamists' violence against Jews and Israelis and strife between Jews and Muslims in order to shield his own identity and to deflect violence against himself, his family, and his co-religionists. E-mail from Seth Barrett Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth Univ., to author (Apr. 19, 2015, 06:10 EST) (on file with author). Although Nakoula clearly was deliberately provocative, there is no indication that he specifically hoped that Jews would be targeted as a result of his actions. It seems likely that his pseudonym was a way to hide his parole violations; whether it was intended to do more is less clear. Even though there is a lack of evidence of his intending to stoke violence, the implications of this possibility are discussed further in infra note 325. 88 was also firebombed in 2011. 107 But the most direct trigger for the violent rampage was a 2012 issue that featured a picture of the Prophet Muhammad lying naked in a pornographic pose.
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On January 7, 2015, two masked gunmen burst into the office of Charlie Hebdo and killed editors and other employees of the magazine during a staff meeting. 109 The gunmen also murdered a caretaker and a police officer, among others. 110 At first, the shooters evaded the police, killing another police officer the following day, but they were ultimately shot after a siege. 111 Additionally, there was a related attack on a kosher grocery store, which was carried out by a friend of the initial attackers.
112
Al Qaeda in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office. 113 The attack was long-planned and professionally executed. 114 Unlike the Danish Cartoons or Innocence of Muslims, there were no spontaneous protests, attacks on embassies, or other targets overseas as initial responses to the cartoons. Likewise, there were no demands that France apologize, or an effort to hold the nation accountable. For three years after the publication of the offending cartoon there seemed to be little reaction until the brutal murders.
In response to the attacks there was a large groundswell of solidarity: 3.7 million people marched in France in criticism of the attacks. 115 However, after the magazine published another issue featuring cartoons of Muhammad in defiance of the massacre, a large wave of violence began, strongly resembling the Jyllands-Posten protests, with individuals killed and homes vandalized.
116 Some of the protests had a strong anti-French theme. 117 There were also non-violent protests in several countries, including Russia, Mali, Somalia, and Lebanon. 118 In July 2015, Laurent Sourisseau, the editor of Charlie Hebdo, declared that the magazine would no longer feature images of the Prophet Muhammad. 119 He emphasized that the magazine had drawn the cartoons "to defend the principle that one can draw whatever they want," and that, "[w]e've done our job. We have defended the right to caricature." 120 The cartoonist who drew the images had also previously declared that he would no longer draw images of the Muhammad. 121 Thus, even though the editor suggested that other cartoonists had taken up the mantle of drawing the similar images, 122 the attacks were successful in silencing at least one of the most visible sources of controversial content.
D. Commonalities and Points of Diversion
The similarities and differences between the controversies are illustrated in the following The facts from these situations help to illustrate some initial themes that will recur throughout the subsequent parts of the Article. The intent of the speaker, for example, is a factor that will recur frequently in the legal analysis that follows, particularly in Parts III and IV. 152 The intent of those producing the images, however, varied dramatically. With Jyllands-Posten, the initial purpose of the cartoons was to stir up a conversation about Islamic images, and the magazine published cartoons both favorable to and critical of Islam. 153 The Innocence of Muslims video maker had an overtly anti-Islamic agenda and saw his film as an attack against Islam. 154 Charlie Hebdo sought to assert its willingness to defy a history of violent acts against the magazine.
155 Regardless of the intent of the initial speaker, or the degree to which the images were intended to offend, the reactions were all substantially similar.
The attacks raise questions about the closeness of the connection between publication of offensive material and violent responses, which is a critical legal factor discussed extensively in Parts II and III. Timing is one element that varied dramatically between the incidents. It took about three months for acts of violence to occur after both Jyllands-Posten 156 and Innocence of Muslims, 157 but with the Charlie Hebdo attack, it took almost three years. 158 Similarly, though, in each of the three controversies, planned and organized terror attacks mixed with spontaneous demonstrations in a deadly way. In response to the Danish cartoons, a non-violent movement was slowly escalated by violent extremists.
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In the backlash to both the Danish cartoons 160 and the Innocence of Muslims, there were seemingly spontaneous acts that were actually organized by professional organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 161 In contrast, after the Charlie Hebdo publication, an organized terror attack preceded any spontaneous protests or violence. 162 The role of professional provocateurs, and whether the attacks were truly directly caused by the cartoons, will be relevant factors throughout Parts II, III, and IV of this Article.
Finally, the Danish cartoon controversy also suggests that non-violent protests can be as effective as violent ones. It was the non-violent threat of a boycott, for example, which initially caused Denmark to apologize for the cartoons. 163 Unfortunately, it seems that this is one lesson from the Danish cartoons controversy that has been forgotten, as non-violent protests played only minor roles in the two subsequent controversies. Part IV discusses how the non-violent protests show the potential for a marketplace-based response, instead of acts of violence.
II. PRE-PUBLICATION RESTRICTIONS ON PROVOCATIVE CONTENT FORBIDDEN
The next two Sections of this Article consider a variety of categories of speech that have been deemed less worthy of Constitutional protection and therefore are more easily proscribed. Section A considers speech that has been deemed sufficiently dangerous to national security that it justifies restraints. The Supreme Court has effectively narrowed this category to only include speech that "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause[s]" harm to national security, e.g. the disclosure of national security secrets. 164 With respect to the publication of national security secrets, the confidential information itself justifies government intervention, in contrast to the publication of provocative materials where it is the reaction or conduct of those receiving the knowledge that might encourage restraint. 165 Section B then turns to post-publication remedies, and examines fighting words, incitement, and true threats as paradigmatic categories of unprotected speech. Each of these is contrasted to provocative speech to show why a restriction on such speech would be inappropriate. It also discusses two statutory prohibitions on speech that the Supreme Court recently reviewed, to illustrate that any bans on provocative content would fail strict scrutiny.
A. The National Security Exception is Exceptionally Narrow
In a situation where the government is aware that a newspaper is about to publish or republish a set of Muhammad images, it might wish to seek an injunction against the publication using the argument that waiting to act until after the publication of such images is futile because the harm will already have been done and violence will likely follow. 166 Such an effort from the government would be based on the national security exception that was established by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 167 and in the Pentagon Papers 168 case. These cases, however, make it clear that this exception is very narrow, and only arises in such circumstances where speech will "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause" harm to national security. 169 As a rule, prior restraints have traditionally been treated with great skepticism by U.S. Courts. 170 In Near, the Supreme Court firmly rejected prior restraints on publication outside of a few narrow exceptions. 171 In that case, a Minnesota law, which restrained the publication of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers, was struck down as a violation of the First Amendment. 172 The Court explored the history of the First Amendment and 164 See discussion infra Section II.A. 165 See discussion infra Section II. found that opposition to British abuses of prior restraint was one of the reasons the First Amendment was ratified. 173 As such, prior restraints generally received far stricter scrutiny than restraints on speech that occurred after publication. 174 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that "the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited." 175 In so doing, the Court laid out a few potential exceptions. 176 Most significantly, the Court recognized that "[w]hen a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured . . . ." 177 In such a situation, the government "might prevent" speech that causes "actual obstruction" of recruiting services, or "the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." 178 While this exception has at times been called the "national security" exception, it is narrower than a grant of authority to restrict any speech that endangers national security; it focuses on either speech that causes "actual obstruction," or the publication of information that will lead to harm to troops and troop movements.
179
The Pentagon Papers case revealed the narrow scope of this specific exception. The United States government sought to block publication in the New York Times of the Pentagon Papers study, which had been leaked by former military analyst Daniel Ellsberg.
180 The Court's opinion was extraordinarily brief. The Court, in a 6-3 opinion, emphasized that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," 181 and that the government had not met the "heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." 182 The Supreme Court as a whole offered no further analysis. However, each of the Justices on the Court at the time wrote a separate concurrence or dissent outlining his views on the case. Because of the myriad of concurrences, it is difficult to discern the core holding from the Pentagon Papers case. 183 examining the separate opinions as a whole, it is clear that prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, and that even the national security exception only applies in narrow circumstances. While Justices Black and Douglas would have completely eliminated the Near exceptions, the rest of the Court at least suggested that exceptions could exist, and thus rejected such an absolutist position. 184 Although the other concurrences were each highly critical of unilateral executive action, 185 and fearful that an overly broad national security exception would lead to the suppression of speech, they did recognize that the government would have the authority to prevent publication of material which would "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause" harm to national security. 186 As a result of the multitude of concurrences, it is not clear how broad the national security exception ultimately is, 187 187 A possible majority of the Court seems to have supported a broad definition of "national defense." Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, emphasized that restraint of information was justified not only for information that would cause "grave and irreparable injury to the United States," but also when the information would have "broad connotations" such as "national preparedness." See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 739-40 (White, J., concurring). Together with the three dissenters, they appear to have formed a majority in favor of a broad reading of the national security exception. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 731-39 (White, J., concurring), 752-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas wrote in favor of completely abolishing the national security exception. Id. at 714-24. Justice Brennan would have narrowed it to "a single, extremely narrow class of cases" involving either a state of war, a situation "tantamount to a time of war," or a situation in peacetime where the consequences of inaction would be tantamount to a nuclear holocaust. See id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a recent case regarding a material support for terrorism statute again suggests that the Court is willing to accept a broad definition of national security when articulated by Congress. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) This case will be discussed in depth in specific and concrete harm is necessary before a prior restraint is permissible. 188 In addition, because The Pentagon Papers case focused solely on the leaks portion of the Near exception and said nothing about speech that causes "actual disruption," it is not clear whether an exception applies to material which does not convey national secrets, but is still harmful to national security. 189 Other Supreme Court cases suggest that exceptions to the ban on prior restraint are to be interpreted narrowly. For instance, in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, the Court rejected an attempt to impose a prior restraint in order to prevent an "invasion of privacy" through the disclosure of critical literature. 190 In another case involving an injunction against a political rally, the Court recognized that there are "special, limited circumstances in which speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected by the broad guarantee of the First Amendment," but found that necessary procedural safeguards, such as notice and the ability for parties to present counter arguments, were not met. 191 The Court has also emphasized that prior restraints can only be allowed if they are "assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint."
192 These cases all suggest that the exceptions to prior restraint are limited, and are meant to be narrowly construed and guarded with robust procedural safeguards. 193 It thus seems unlikely that the existing exception would be broadened to encompass the publication of provocative material. . 188 Reviewing the specific claims advanced by the Solicitor General in his secret brief shows that most of the claims focused on generalities and abstract harms which were uncertain to occur, which fails to fulfill the requirement that publication "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause" harm. See generally Sims, supra note 183, at 413-14 (describing the various claims made by the government in the secret brief). 189 In the Court's recent United States v. Alvarez decision, the plurality seemed to broadly categorize Near as creating a speech exemption for "speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent." 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). However, the Court also emphasized that "a restriction under" this category of speech "is most difficult to sustain." Id. III.B) shows that perhaps the Supreme Court is more willing to uphold restrictions on speech when the goal of the restriction is to combat terrorism. However, the Supreme Court itself has not shown any indication of a relaxing of the standard for prior restraints to be issued and continues to aggressively strike down what it sees as prior restraints. 194 One unanswered question that remains after Near and Pentagon Papers is whether additional exceptions can be recognized. In Pentagon Papers, Justice Brennan said that there was only "a single, extremely narrow class of cases" that justified prior restraints, suggesting that he did not recognize the other exceptions that the Court mentioned in Near, such as incitement or obscenity, let alone the possibility of additional exceptions. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring). David Fialkow has written that contrary to Justice Brennan's argument, the national security exception remains the easiest exception to trigger, but it is not the only one that exists. 195 and subject to the strictest scrutiny. 196 The Court also clarified that such restraint is only proper when "the evil that would result . . . is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures."
197 Thus, the harm that would result from a publication must be "great and certain," and the measure of restraint must be truly necessary before prior restraints will be permitted. 198 As the following section shall illustrate, provocative images of Muhammad fall far short of this lofty standard.
B. The National Security Exception Should Not Apply to Provocative Speech
As outlined in the previous Section, prior restraints for national security purposes are only permitted in very narrow circumstances, specifically when publication "inevitably, directly, and immediately" causes harm to national security. Allowing the government to block the publication of provocative or offensive speech is inappropriate and falls short of this high standard. This Section discusses several concerns that such prior restraints would raise if applied to offensive speech, such as images of Muhammad. First, such restrictions would run afoul of precedent declaring that prior restraints are inappropriate for preventing religious offense. Second, such restrictions cannot be said to "inevitably, directly, and immediately" cause harm to national security. Third, the harm caused by such speech differs fundamentally from the harm caused by the release of national security secrets. Fourth, because of these differences, restrictions on provocative speech would not be judicially manageable. Finally, these restrictions would be ineffective for both technological and pragmatic reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has already rejected an expansion of the prior restraint doctrine for offensive religious material. In a case highly relevant to the publication of offensive religious images, the Supreme Court concluded that avoiding offending get, but it is not the only prior restraint exception to survive Pentagon Papers). As Professor Meyerson noted, much of the problem with defining prior restraints stems from the fact that "the Court neither defined prior restraint, nor explained precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior restraint." Meyerson, supra note 179, at 1087. 195 See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (right to a fair trial could not justify restraint on press access and publication about a trial). 196 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766 (1994) (noting that there is a "heavy presumption" against the constitutionality of prior restraints). 197 327 (1999) (discussing prior restraints that the Court has allowed). These restraints seem to be distinct from the type of prior restraint sought in Pentagon Papers for at least two reasons. First, restrictions on permits are focused on time, place, or manner, which generally has been subject to more limited scrutiny. Second, the Supreme Court has required that permit policies be based on clearly articulable standards and may not leave too much discretion to those implementing the policy. In contrast, it is much more difficult to articulate clear standards for a national security exception. For these reasons, for purposes of this article, permits and other time, place, and manner restrictions are not treated as a form of prior restraint. religious sentiments could not justify a prior restraint on the publication of a sacrilegious film. 199 The Supreme Court declared that, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.
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Thus, if the purpose of an injunction is to prevent offense to religious sentiment, such a purpose is illegitimate. This decision suggests that any effort to prevent speech that is potentially offensive to religious sentiment will be viewed with particular skepticism, even if there is a purported national security connection. It is likely that courts will view any attempted justification of a restriction as not intended to prevent offense, but merely intended to protect against violence, as pretextual.
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Second, it is difficult or impossible to say that the publication of provocative images, such as those of Muhammad, "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause[s]" attacks. While it is quite clear that publication of depictions of Muhammad have already led to terror attacks both against civilians and U.S. diplomatic and military targets, there remain significant problems of timing and causation regarding predicting responses to any future publication of provocative speech. 202 As already discussed in Part I, it took several months after the publication of the Danish cartoons for violent backlash to occur, with months of diplomacy, and discussion preceding any violence. 203 When American Pastor Terry Jones threatened to burn the Koran, the international backlash occurred in a mere two weeks. 204 In stark contrast, Al Qaeda planned its attack on Charlie Hebdo for years before finally executing it. 205 It is difficult to determine which of these incidents qualify as being caused "immediately," as a result of publication, and even more difficult to evaluate this before the speech is published. Likewise, the publication or republication of a variety of depictions of the Prophet Muhammad has met with tepid or nonexistent reactions, making it difficult to predict which cartoons or images will provoke a serious backlash, thus, it is invalid to call the reactions "certain" or "inevitable." Indeed, as seen in the case of the Danish cartoons, the publication of the images led to diplomacy and discussions, which only gradually escalated into violence as a result of mistakes on the part of the Danes and exploitation by Islamic leaders. 206 This suggests that unlike the release of classified intelligence, such as the location of troops, the publication of the cartoons cannot be said to generate the type of "great and certain" harm needed to justify prior restraints.
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Directness is also difficult to establish. As the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi illustrates, planned terrorist attacks and spontaneous demonstrations can become conflated.
208 Likewise, with the Danish cartoons, clerics co-opted the protests for general anti-Western or anti-government causes. 209 With so many other mixed motivating factors, it will be difficult for a court to say that the cartoons will "directly" cause any attacks. Professor Tribe has suggested that only "the unusual clarity of the prepublication showing of harm" can justify prior restraints. 210 Yet, because there are so many unpredictable variables with the publication of provocative images, such an "unusual clarity" will almost invariably be absent.
Third, the release of information damaging to national security is fundamentally different than the publication of provocative speech. Releasing state secrets directly provides an enemy with insider information to which they otherwise would not have had access. The danger with publication of classified information is that the information itself provides an enemy an opportunity to cause harm. 211 While the Government can of course move troops from disclosed locations, the harm is already done immediately upon publication because the harm is the release of the information itself. 212 Release of information in this way is often considered irreparable because it cannot be retracted or removed from the marketplace after publication. 213 In contrast, when publishing of depictions of Muhammad, the harm is not in the content or the information itself, but rather in the public's reaction to the content. Neither the Innocence of Muslims film nor the various Muhammad cartoons disclosed any state secrets or illegally acquired intelligence. Instead, the harm caused by these depictions was that they engendered violent attacks against either the publishers or the country of origin. The resulting harm was not because of an inherent trait of the author's intent or of the provocative content, but because of the listener's reaction. 214 The same image that might have been innocuous 206 See supra Section I.A. 207 Cf. Stone, supra note 166, at 202. 208 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 209 See supra Section I.A. 210 TRIBE, supra note 198 § 12-36, at 1047. 211 It is the fact that "the government must, to a certain extent, keep some information confidential because it is simply too sensitive or dangerous to expose to the public" which justifies state secrets being subject to prior restraints. 212 Id. 213 Id. 214 The Court's antipathy towards injunctions in the fair trial context also illustrates this distinction. Professor Wells has argued that in the Nebraska Free Press case the Court rejected an injunction "against obviously high-value speech" despite "the potential danger caused by that speech." Such cases involving only several years ago transforms into a dangerous publication because of the potential reaction from terrorists and radicals. As will be discussed further in Part IV, this terrorist's veto is deeply contrary to first amendment principles.
Fourth, this distinction between national security concerns and the potential for extremist responses means that an exception for provocative content would be much less judicially manageable than the exception for national security information. With national security issues, it is relatively easy to establish that, at the very least, the information is classified, 215 and related to military positions and strategies. 216 The Pentagon Papers case suggests that harm to the nation's reputation or standing is an insufficient harm to trigger the national security exception. A court's inquiry is thus much narrower and more judicially manageable in the case of national security intelligence. Judicial decisionmaking regarding provocative speech, in contrast to national security concerns, requires a far more searching inquiry into whether the speech will provoke a violent reaction. 217 The court is not simply evaluating the information itself, but the impact that information will have. Yet, as seen with each of the above controversies, a wide variety of human factors must converge to produce such violent reactions, and it is difficult to predict whether publication of a certain set of images or words will cause harm. 218 Giving courts such vast discretion with regard to determining how harmful the impact of certain speech will be is a concern that has led courts to view prior restraints unfavorably: "the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." 219 Fifth, the efficacy of prior restraints is also highly questionable in light of the incredible developments in technology, and the ability of individuals to disseminate information in an instant. 220 Even in the 1970s when the Pentagon Papers case was decided, Justices White and Stewart noted that usually "publication will occur and the high value speech require "a far more complex weighing of factors." See Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000). 215 The legislative branch is also involved in questions of classifications, which reduce the concerns raised in Pentagon Papers regarding solely executive conduct. See supra note 173. 216 Indeed, it is clear that this is precisely what happened in the Pentagon Papers case where the Court was able to see through the abstract and inconclusive asserted harms of the government, to conclude that publication would not cause the kind of imminent harm needed to justify prior restraint. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 217 Professor Tribe argues that evidentiary certainty is what has allowed for prior restraints in certain contexts, such as obscenity. A judge can just as easily determine whether something is obscene before publication as after because the test is not dependent on the reaction of a third party, but on pre-existing community norms. In contrast, with the publication of provocative speech, the harm is solely in the reaction of those viewing the speech, which requires evidence that is only available after publication. See TRIBE, supra note 198 § 12-36, at 1048. But see David Rudenstine, The Courts and National Security: The Ordeal of the State Secrets Privilege, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 90-91 (2014) (arguing that the judiciary can be trusted with a greater role in national security matters because "in some landmark national security cases, federal judges have exercised meaningful review, and by so doing have contributed to the prestige and legitimacy of the courts"). 218 See supra Section I.D. 219 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980) . 220 President Obama suggested as much in his speech before the U.N. regarding the Innocence of Muslims video: "But in 2012, at a time when anyone with a cell phone can spread offensive views around the world with the click of a button, the notion that we can control the flow of information is obsolete. The question, then, is how do we respond?" Obama, supra note 16. damage be done before the Government has either opportunity or grounds for suppression," and that "efficacy" of prior restraints is "doubtful at best." 221 Technological advances certainly make the possibility of a successful prior restraint far less likely. As has been argued, concern over prior restraint "appears in hindsight almost medieval given the ease with which any individual can anonymously upload classified information to the Internet and the ease, in turn, with which that information can suddenly 'go viral. '" 222 Indeed, David Corneil argues that the requirement that publication will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage," means that a prior restraint can almost never be acquired in time to prevent the release of information. 223 Prior restraints imposed for provocative images are unlikely to be effective. 225 For one, it is not at all clear that restricting the publication or republication of such images will actually do anything to limit violent outrage.
226 This is especially true given that those seeking to spark outrage are responsible for much of the spread of the images. 227 These individuals may be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts, and, thus, efforts to restrain publication will be unavailing. 228 Moreover, given the nature of the internet it is far too easy for image to be reposted anonymously. Additionally, the mere fact that someone is attempting to publish such an image may be sufficient to trigger a reaction, especially if radical elements seek an excuse for provocation. 229 230 it would be relatively easy to manufacture a controversy based on the mere allegation that such an image was to be published.
These practical concerns give greater emphasis to the aforementioned doctrinal concerns. With so much dependent on how others choose to respond to the publication of the images, it is impossible to say that harm "inevitably, directly, and immediately" follows publication. Unlike the release of state secrets, where release of the information itself causes harm, organized efforts were needed to provoke violence in response to each of the controversial publications. 231 Because of the potential for individuals to use the threat of harm as a way to stifle speech they find offensive, prior restraints are an inappropriate response to provocative images. 232 The same distinction exists with respect to other categories of unprotected speech discussed below.
III. EFFORTS TO PUNISH PROVOCATIVE SPEECH WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As outlined above, allowing prior restraints against the publication of provocative images would be deeply inappropriate because the restraint would be justified not by the speech itself or the speaker's intent, but by the reaction of listeners and the ability of terrorists to exploit such speech. Due to the same concerns about allowing a terrorist's veto, post-publication punishment of provocative speech is likewise inappropriate. Such restrictions would be an unprecedented and inappropriate erosion of First Amendment rights.
To illustrate this point, the first section below considers some of the categories of unprotected speech that are most analogous to provocative speech. This analysis illustrates that none of the restraints placed on speech in these categories are justified solely by the reaction of listeners. Having established that provocative speech is protected speech, the second section considers two recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrating that statutes proscribing the publication of provocative content are very likely to fail strict scrutiny.
A. Provocative Images Are Fully Protected Speech
The Supreme Court has emphasized that there might exist "some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected . recognize a new category of unprotected speech, it requires "persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription." 234 This is a burden that those advocating for an exemption for publication of offensive content, such as Muhammad cartoons, cannot meet. Not only is there no tradition of proscription, but the justifications advanced for the proscription of such speech drastically depart from the justifications underlying other unprotected speech.
Unlike Fighting Words, Provocative Images Are Speech with High Intrinsic Worth
The fighting words exception focuses on whether certain words provoke a violent reaction, and for that reason it appears very similar to an exception for provocative content. 235 At first glance, the fighting words exception seems to provide support for restrictions of speech solely based on the reaction of the listener. Indeed, scholars have noted that this exception "seems not only archaic but also wholly illogical," and have expressed surprise that this exception has not been "mercifully overruled long since." 236 Yet, due to fear of a heckler's veto, the fighting words exception was dramatically narrowed by the Supreme Court to only encompass speech of extremely limited social value and highly provocative content. 237 The Supreme Court has taken a "libertarian approach to fighting words cases" and dramatically limited the application of fighting words doctrine. 238 Indeed, Supreme Court cases have shown that the category of impermissible fighting words is incredibly small or even non-existent. 239 The Supreme Court has declared that " [r] Georgia statute which extended fighting words to "opprobrious" and "abusive" words). 240 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). As Professor Gerard has noted, historically laws banning lewd and profane words were common at the time of ratification of both the First and Fourteenth individual's conviction for addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place." 241 The individual had called a City Marshall "a damned fascist," and the Supreme Court concluded that the use of such "epithets or personal abuse" is "of such slight social value as a step to truth" that it does not constitute protected speech. 242 Even in affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court emphasized that the category of fighting words was narrow. Specifically, the Court focused on words which "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." 243 The Supreme Court also seemed to imply that such words must be uttered in a "face-to-face" setting. 244 Thus, fighting words are punishable precisely because they are considered intrinsically valueless, and are delivered in the setting least conducive to discourse and most conducive to acts of violence. 245 From Chaplinsky and other fighting words cases, five limitations on what can be considered fighting words can be drawn. While the publication of provocative images like the Muhammad cartoons or the Innocence of Muslims film unquestionably includes some of the elements of fighting words, it varies from each of these limitations in significant ways.
First, the words must be of "slight social value." 246 The Supreme Court has made it clear that even speech that is highly offensive is protected if it makes a contribution to the marketplace of ideas. This is especially true for offensive religious speech. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted for playing in public a record that attacked other churches as instruments of the devil. 247 The Supreme Court emphasized that in the religious sphere, "sharp differences arise," and because of the urgency of religious messages speakers may resort "to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement."
248 Yet, despite "the probability of excesses and abuses" permitting such speech is "essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy." 249 Cantwell thus suggests that provocative speech regarding religion has, if anything, heightened constitutional protection as a result of the vital nature of religious speech. CONSENT 72 (1975) ("There is such a thing as verbal violence, a kind of cursing, assaultive speech that amounts to almost physical aggression, bullying that is no less punishing because it is simulated."). 246 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 247 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296. 248 Id. at 310. 249 Id.
It is unfair to say that provocative images are "of such slight social value as a step to truth" that they do not deserve Constitutional protection. 250 Publication of images of Muhammad is meant to provoke the audience into thinking critically about political and social events of great importance. The editors of Jyllands-Posten intended to spark a discussion on political correctness and the role of religion in a Western Liberal democracy, and were in fact able to engender exactly that sort of debate. 251 The editors of Charlie Hebdo likewise hoped to push the boundaries of acceptable speech, and show that Islam is not above caricature or satire. 252 Even the Innocence of Muslims film, which was deliberately and unquestionably provocative, still was meant to communicate its creator's viewpoint regarding the founding narrative of Islam. 253 Just as with the religious speech in Cantwell, these images at times indulge in "exaggeration" and in "excesses and abuses" but are on a topic of great public and private concern. Unlike epithets merely leveled for the sake of insult, which can rightly be described as "weapons hurled in anger to inflict injury or invite retaliation," 254 the publication of such images can constitute commentary on the state of the world and on dangers of racial Islamic fundamentalism. In this sense, the Muhammad images differ greatly from the epithets from Chaplinsky.
255
They are "chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force," and mere "hostility to their assertion or exercise" does not strip such ideas of Constitutional protection. 256 Second, fighting words must be "directed" at the listener and akin to "a direct personal insult," rather than a more generalized insult or offense. 257 Neither wearing a profane jacket in a courthouse, 258 nor burning an American flag can qualify as fighting words.
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The provocative images involved in the above controversies were not delivered "face-to-face" or "directed" at a specific listener. Instead, they were published in magazines or on the internet, and contained a general criticism of the Islamic faith or of radical Islamic fundamentalism. 260 It is therefore inappropriate to call these provocative 250 images "a direct personal insult," especially considering the huge number of Muslims in the world, and the unpredictable nature of each individual's response to these images.
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While there is limited Supreme Court precedent for the idea that speech directed at groups may be punished, 262 this precedent has been seriously called into question 263 and is highly unlikely to apply in a fighting words setting. 264 Although the flag burning of Texas v. Johnson is closely analogous to the speech in the above controversies (both are highly insulting to large groups of individuals who may take offense), Johnson has been read to stand for the principle that the government "cannot forbid all offensive speech because violence may occasionally result." 265 Professor Greenawalt has argued that what sets apart a case like Johnson where restrictions are impermissible, and other cases where restrictions are allowed, is the presence or absence of "specific victims" as opposed to generalized group offense. 266 Additionally, in recent years the Supreme Court has shown even less inclination to allow restrictions on speech based on a generalized group offense. , http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/prophet-muhammad-images-draw-varied-reactions-within-muslimcommunity-1.2899987. 262 In the defamation context, the Court upheld an Illinois statute that punished group libel, and held that "if an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952). Some dicta from the Beauharnais case could be analogized to the context of speech offensive to religions. For instance, the court discussed how "willful purveyors of falsehood concerning . . . religious groups promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community." Id. at 259. Moreover, the Court criticized "false or malicious defamation of . . . religious groups, made in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it was presented." Id. at 261. 263 See O'Neil, supra note 12, at 483 (" [T] he Beauharnais ruling has not fared well over time and would be cited at an advocate's peril."). 264 Most scholars suggest that laws that proscribe things such as group defamation or insults targeting a broad class would be unconstitutional. See This is especially true given that the Muhammad cartoons touch upon matters of public concern just as did the anti-gay speech in Snyder v. Phelps, which the Supreme Court held was protected in an 8-1 decision. 562 U.
S. 443 (2011). See Douglas Behrens, Balancing Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Third, the Supreme Court has suggested that any breach of the peace that occurs must truly be imminent. For instance, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia statute because it covered conduct that did not lead to an "immediate violent response." 268 As discussed in Part II, it is difficult to say that publication of the provocative speech caused an "immediate violent response." Indeed, sometimes the publication of provocative speech led to threats of attacks that were carried out months or years later. Moreover, in each of the controversies, the violent reactions were spurred by provocateurs who sought to capitalize on the controversy. 269 Thus, mere publication without more cannot be said to cause an "immediate violent response" akin to a direct personal attack. Given the disparity, in both timing and scope, between the reactions of violence in each of the above controversies, it is inaccurate to say that publication of provocative speech will always lead to an imminent disturbance of the peace.
Fourth, fighting words cannot be regulated in a way that takes into account the speaker's viewpoint. 270 Even actions that unquestionably constitute fighting words or true threats cannot "be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." 271 Yet, that is precisely what would happen if provocative speech lost its constitutional protection. 272 Many of the newspapers that published the Muhammad cartoons also published cartoons lambasting Christianity. 273 Likewise, rituals and practices considered sacred by members of the Church of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints have been parodied and displayed in musicals and TV Shows. 274 Yet, even though such speech offends members of these faiths, there is a lack of the same sort of vociferous and hateful reaction as to the publication of images of Muhammad. 275 The resultant application of any exception for provocative speech is that 
) (discussing the emphasis that the Snyder Court put on the fact that the speech was of public concern). Indeed, it seems highly improbable that the same Court which recently found the Westboro Baptist Church's "God Hates Fags" funeral demonstration to be protected speech would find it acceptable to punish speech that is highly offensive even to a majority of the general public. 268 anti-Christian or anti-Mormon speech would be acceptable, while anti-Islamic speech restricted. 276 This selective prohibition on speech is precisely the evil that the First Amendment is intended to prevent. 277 Fifth, the fighting words exception must not be employed to provide an opportunity for a heckler's veto. 278 Looking at the Court's precedent regarding fighting words, it is clear that one of the reasons the Court limits fighting words to face-to-face confrontations where epithets are personally directed to cause an immediate reaction is that it does not want to allow organized and systemic outrage to stifle unpopular or controversial ideas. 279 The application of this concept to provocative images will be discussed further below, but for now it suffices to note that any restriction on provocative speech would provide precisely the opportunity for groups to stifle unpopular or offensive speech that has been so odious in the fighting words context.
Each of these restrictions on the scope of the fighting words doctrine has been established by the Supreme Court to ensure that the exception does not swallow the general rule of freedom to speak out on controversial topics. They illustrate the extent to , http://theweek.com/articles/531501/charlie-hebdo-attacks-show-that-all-blasphemies-are-equal ("But those Muslims who are faithful to a religious tradition concerned primarily with restoring fidelity to sources from the first three centuries of Islam were not a party to the secularist bargain. And we ought to be aware that we are asking them to live as Christians, and to be insulted like them, too."). 276 It has been suggested that this effect might even raise Establishment Clause concerns. See Tabash, supra note 260, at 12 ("Accordingly, no members of a religion have any greater rights than any others to call upon government to censor offensive spoken words, written articles, or films."). While I find this argument highly implausible because the government restriction would have neither the purpose nor effect of establishing or favoring religion, this argument draws further attention to lack of viewpoint neutrality. See id. ("Any legal system will suffer enormously diminished legitimacy as a protector of free speech if advocates of a certain point of view are the only ones given the right to silence opponents. This legitimacy would be even more gravely compromised if that legal system harbors even the slightest assumption that violence perpetrated by adherents of one set of beliefs-upon hearing or seeing offensive commentsdeserves more lenient treatment than the same kind of violence perpetrated by adherents of any other beliefs."). 277 See Zvi Triger, Discriminating Speech: The Heterophilia of the Freedom of Speech Doctrine, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 349, 371 (2013) (explaining that "'feelings' and 'hurt' are not neutral terms," and that attempting to proscribe such speech is a highly subjective and fraught endeavor). 278 The Sixth Circuit recently issued a powerful decision affirming the importance of defending freedom of expression against a heckler's veto. In that decision, the court affirmed the right of Christian protestors to distribute anti-Islamic leaflets at an Arab International Festival. The court found that the police had erred when they asked the protesters to disband in the face of an unruly counter-protest where attendees threw rocks and other objects at the Christian protesters. See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015). 279 Cox, 379 U.S. at 551-52. which a provocative speech exception would deviate from First Amendment norms, and would allow for manufactured outrage to drown out voices asserting controversial or unpopular points of view.
Unlike Incitement or True Threats, Provocative Speech Lacks an Intent to Cause Harm
Incitement and true threats illustrate another element common in unprotected speech that is absent from the publication of provocative speech. Specifically, both incitement and true threats require the speaker to have a certain level of specific intent to harm, which is absent in all of the controversies discussed.
Black's Law Dictionary defines incitement as " [t] he act or an instance of provoking, urging on, or stirring up." 280 While this definition of incitement encompasses speech that provokes lawless action, as well speech that urges or encourages lawless action, the legal standard for incitement limits punishment to only the latter. 281 The modern test for incitement comes from Brandenburg v. Ohio. 282 The state is forbidden from proscribing "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation" unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 283 Thus, the intent of the speaker, and whether the speech is "directed to inciting," is critical to determining whether incitement occurred. 284 It is this key element that distinguishes provocative speech from incitement. As the Supreme Court has noted, "mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence" is insufficient to qualify as incitement, 285 and even "offensive and coercive speech" is protected. 286 Thus, incitement is punishable precisely because the individual speaks with the desire or purpose of facilitating a crime. In this way, a speaker is culpable for the conduct of those whom he addresses and incites. 287 True threats are punished for substantially similar reasons. True threats are defined as "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." 288 Thus, intent to intimidate or convey a serious threat is an essential element. Even if serious fear or apprehension occurs, absent the requisite intent, a threat cannot be penalized. True threats are also distinct because they make the recipients of the threat feel apprehensive for their safety, 289 in contrasts to provocative images that do not engender in the listener a personal safety concern. 290 Another important contrast between the publication of provocative images and incitement or true threats, similar to the distinction from fighting words, involves the value of the ideas promoted. The message of the images involved in all three of the controversies outlined above included a commentary on the politics of religion, rather than mere prompting of illegal activity or threats of such activity, which are often the subject of incitement or true threats. As Cass Sunstein has argued, "There is little democratic value in protecting simple counsels of murder." 291 Thus, the high bar for prosecuting incitement or true threats containing little social value suggests that even greater caution is appropriate when prosecuting the publication of cartoons conveying a myriad of political messages. 292 Given these guidelines, true threats and incitement are not protected because they are delivered with intent to either incite or threaten, and they fail to contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Provocative speech differs on both fronts. For these reasons, provocative speech should be considered fully protected speech.
B. Efforts to Punish the Publication of Provocative Speech Would Fail Strict Scrutiny
Having established that provocative speech is fully protected, any law restricting or barring the publication of such speech would be subject to strict scrutiny. 293 Two recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate why any attempt to proscribe provocative speech would likely fail strict scrutiny. In the first, the Supreme Court upheld, but narrowly construed, a restriction on speech carried out in conjunction with a terrorist organization. 294 In the second, the Supreme Court rejected efforts to punish false speech regarding veteran's status. 295 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that restricted material support to terrorist organizations, including training and other speech related activities. 296 Material support was widely defined to include "any property, tangible or intangible, or service."
297 Such material support must be knowingly granted, but there need not be intent to further the organization's terrorist activities. 298 In a closely divided decision, the Supreme Court found that the statute was not overly vague and did not violate the First Amendment.
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The Humanitarian Law Project decision has been widely derided by scholars as contorting existing First Amendment doctrine to chill speech. 300 Certainly, in theory, allowing speech to be proscribed because it helps terrorist groups seems like a dramatic expansion. 301 However, the Court's ruling was ultimately much narrower than that. The Supreme Court expressly construed the statute to not apply to any form of "independent activity."
302 Thus, any activity such as the publication of a cartoon that is not done "under the direction of, or in coordination with [foreign] terrorist organizations" is not punishable under this statute.
303
This important distinction led the Court to conclude that the statute was "carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech," which involved direct coordination with a terrorist organization. 304 As such, even though the law directly burdened speech, the Court found that it successfully met strict scrutiny. In terms of the arguments for proscribing provocative speech, this distinction is completely absent. None of those who 296 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8. 297 Id. at 8-9. 414-19 (2013) . 301 Indeed, an overly broad reading might even encompass the publication of provocative cartoons of Muhammad. Given the acts of violence perpetuated as a result of these images, an individual publishing a provocative image of Muhammad knows that such an image would provide a terrorist organization with "property" or a "service," which could then be used to increase recruitment or rally anti-Americanism. Yet, such a broad application of the statute correctly seems to be a gross expansion of what Congress intended the statute to proscribe. 302 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24. 303 Id. at 26. published provocative images were working "in coordination with" those who committed acts of violence. Indeed, they deplored and spoke out critically against the violence that occurred. 305 Even though the publishers may have known that their speech could be used by terrorists to encourage violent conduct, there was no coordination between the publishers and any terrorist groups, a factor the Court found necessary in order to avoid serious constitutional problems. Indeed, the majority made it clear that, "we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations." 306 Here again, the Court chooses to leave only intrinsically dangerous speech open to restrictions: speech that is fostered from close coordination with a terrorist organization.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Alvarez-striking down the Stolen Valor Act that made it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military decoration or medals-further illustrates that a prohibition on provocative speech would fail strict scrutiny. 307 Even though these kinds of lies "may offend the true holders of the Medal" and "insult[] their bravery and high principles," the Supreme Court emphasized that the remedy for such false speech "is speech that is true."
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The plurality opinion discusses at length a wide range of false statements that have been constitutionally proscribed, including false statements made to government officials, perjury, and false representations on behalf of the government. 309 In each instance, the Court emphasized that the context and nature of the speech distinguished it from simple lies or puffery. 310 Perjured statements are particularly problematic because they "undermine[] the function and province of the law."
311 Perjury statues characterize the harm of perjury as inherent in the fact that an individual lied despite the "formality and gravity" of the oath proceeding, rather than dependent on any subsequent consequences. The same is true of other false speech regulations, such as those for false representation that one is a government official. 312 The Court emphasized that these types of speech "implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct," and therefore can be proscribed. 313 Again, while the Court is willing to affirm restrictions on speech that causes direct harm by its nature, it is unwilling to allow restrictions on speech that only tangentially causes harm. Like false statements about military honor, the publication of the Muhammad cartoons only caused indirect harm. Unlike perjury or pretending to be a police officer, neither the content of the publication itself, nor the context of publication, causes the kind of direct harm that the Court has identified as punishable. In light of 305 See supra Part I. 306 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39. 307 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537 (striking down a statute that made it illegal to falsely claim receipt of military decoration or medals). 308 Id. at 2550. The Court also noted that "[o]nly a weak society needs government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth." Id. 309 Id. at 2546. 310 Id. (an example is the Court's characterization of perjury as "at war with justice," because it "threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system"). 311 Id. 312 Id. 313 Id.
Humanitarian Law Project and Alvarez, it is highly unlikely that a statute prohibiting the publication of provocative images could survive strict scrutiny.
IV. THE TERRORIST'S VETO AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
As the preceding sections have shown, efforts to prohibit provocative speech would be especially pernicious because such speech suffers from none of the inherent defects of the categories of unprotected speech, but instead would be proscribed solely on the basis of listeners' reactions. This would constitute a terrorist's veto. The terrorist's veto is similar in many ways to the heckler's veto that the Court has spoken out against in the fighting words context, but has some distinctive features that make it significantly more troubling from a First Amendment standpoint. Although these ideas have been discussed in Parts II and III of this Article, this Part brings together strands of analysis from the various types of speech discussed in order to more fully describe how a terrorist's veto is inconsistent with the First Amendment.
First, the value of the speech threatened by the terrorist's veto is far more likely to be high-value political and/or religious speech that deserves heightened protection. 314 For instance, the heckler's veto frequently arises in the fighting words context where speech is of "slight social value," 315 or in response to threats or incitement that have "little democratic value." 316 Thus, any heckler's veto in those contexts is less likely to disrupt valuable speech. In contrast, the Muhammad images that led to violence raise important questions about religious pluralism, fundamentalism, and the boundaries of speech.
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The Jyllands-Posten cartoons in particular touched upon matters of ongoing debate and discussion in Denmark and elsewhere. 318 The Charlie Hebdo cartoons likewise sparked debate about the appropriateness of religious satire. 319 319 See supra Section I.C. 320 See supra Section I.B.
Fags" signs held by the Westboro Baptist church deserved heightened First Amendment protection, even though such speech was highly provocative, so too does the publication of provocative images of the Prophet Muhammad. 321 Additionally, as suggested earlier, speech that touches on religion deserves added protection because of the vital nature of religious discourse. 322 The terrorist's veto will almost always target highly valuable speech touching on vital matters of politics and religion, which will require protection under the First Amendment.
Second, the terrorist's veto seems completely unconcerned with the speaker's intent. As discussed in Part III of the article, in many cases where the heckler's veto arises, a speaker will have diminished protection because of an intent to harm. Although malicious intent is not expressly required with fighting words, it is implied by the fact that the speech must be a "direct personal insult" akin to "an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." 323 Malicious intent is expressly required with incitement and true threats where the speaker either expressly desires that an unlawful act occurs, or intends to frighten or intimidate the listener. 324 In contrast, those publishing images of the Prophet Muhammad had a wide variety of intents: of those discussed, the Innocence of Muslims filmmaker stands on one extreme, as he unapologetically hoped to offend though he did not desire a violent reaction; 325 the Jyllands-Posten editors hoped to spark a conversation about censorship, but were certainly aware of the possibility of offending; and on the other end of the spectrum Jyttee Klausen wrote an academic book on the Danish cartoon saga and had no desire to offend or provoke, but still had her speech stifled by the terrorist's veto. 326 The Charlie Hebdo editors are somewhat in the middle between these two extremes, as they sought to lampoon and satirize, but also acted with the goal of 397, 398 (1989) . 324 See supra Section III.A.ii. 325 But see Email from Seth Barrett Tillman to author, supra note 87. If it were true that Nakoula actually intended to direct his speech in order to specifically trigger an act of violence against Jews or Israelis, his act would share a common intent component with incitement or true threats. See supra Section III.B. Under such narrow circumstances it might be permissible to proscribe such behavior. However, it might be difficult to draft a statute that would narrowly target only this class of behavior without including otherwise protected speech. As evidenced by the continuing ambiguity regarding Nakoula's motives, intent would also be quite difficult to prove in such cases. 326 See supra Section I.D. pushing the boundaries of free speech. 327 The terrorist's veto is dangerous because it is a blunt force, indifferent to whether the author actually intended to offend.
Third, because the terrorist's veto, when granted, validates the feeling of offense or outrage, it can further encourage encroachment on once acceptable speech. This is powerfully illustrated by outrage over images featuring Muhammad. Images of the Prophet Muhammad were an accepted part of both Christian and Islamic society until very recently, and yet fear of potentially violent reactions has led to publishers to decide not to publish or republish such historically acceptable images; 328 Similarly, Comedy Central censored an episode of the show South Park that included images of Muhammad, despite the fact that the episode had previously aired without incident. 329 What has changed is not the nature of the speech itself nor its publication, but simply the reaction from the audience. It is the radicalization of certain sects of Islam that has led to divergent reactions rather than a change in the content or form of the speech. 330 As attitudes continue to harden towards the publication of images of Muhammad, it is likely that the terrorist's veto will continue to chill more and more content that was once acceptable. 331 Fourth, the heckler traditionally seeks to disrupt the speech of the individual speaking; in contrast, the terrorist's veto often instead targets nations, or individuals wholly unconnected to the speech. 332 As such, the terrorist's veto creates an environment where the speaker not only fears for his own safety, but is chilled out of a fear of endangering others. Newspapers chose not to republish the cartoons because they feared that their staffers, writers, or editors would be targeted, even if many of them were unconnected to the cartoons and were merely reporting on them. 333 The terrorist's veto turns the choice to publish into one that endangers others in addition to oneself, which increases the chilling effect. Fifth, with the terrorist's veto, grassroots outrage is co-opted by organized extremism. As such, the organized nature of the terrorist's veto differs from a heckler's veto scenario where outrage is typically spontaneous and disorganized. 334 In each of the controversies discussed, organized groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, instigated violence both because of opposition to the speech and in order to achieve political objectives. 335 The terrorist's veto is dangerous because the forces seeking to stifle speech are particularly well organized and capable of following through on threats, and are therefore likely to make further demands once their initial demands are met.
Sixth, just as with the traditional heckler's veto, allowing for the suppression of offensive speech if it triggers a violent reaction would have the perverse incentive of discouraging civilized and reasoned responses to offensive material. 336 Even though the peaceful response to the Danish cartoons succeeded in producing an official apology and encouraged a thoughtful debate, ultimately the violent attacks are what remained in the public conscience. Unfortunately, it seems that the message learned from the Danish cartoon controversy is that provoking violence is both acceptable and profitable. 337 If those threatening violence see that such an approach produces results, such threats are more likely to be employed in the future. For this reason, a terrorist's veto must not be allowed to become a legitimate response to provocative speech.
Finally, in contrast to the heckler's veto, the violence threatened by the terrorist's veto is often delayed. 338 As mentioned in the context of prior restraints, imminent harm has traditionally been a vital check against government overreach and the censorship of unpopular ideas. 339 Because the harm from a terrorist's veto is not necessarily imminent or directly caused by the speech itself (like with the release of secrets, the fear caused by a true threat, or the traditional heckler's veto scenario), there is abundant time for counter speech. 340 As President Obama made clear, "the strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression; it is more speech . . . ."
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That counter-speech is an availment to provocative speech is abundantly clear. Despite the violence, the cartoon controversy also lead to many earnest discussions of the nature of freedom of expression and the need to respect religious viewpoints. With the release of controversial images, there are likely to be people on both sides who will exploit the controversy, but also a spirited debate is likely to begin. 342 With the Danish cartoons in particular, peaceful protests and appeals to common decency and brotherhood were arguably far more successful than violence at truly impacting hearts and minds. This is the natural process of the marketplace where ideas can be criticized, debated and discussed. 343 Any governmental involvement threatens to distort this process and cut off debate.
The market has also shown itself to be quite adept at responding to the publication of such cartoons. 344 Most U.S. newspapers, like the New York Times, made reasoned decisions not to republish the provocative cartoons. 345 Networks, such as Comedy
[of] the miniscule possibility of a physical outcry"). Although the internet has certainly made a variety of material more accessible, books, newspapers, and magazines have always allowed information to remain latent and available. For instance, an individual could pick up the Hit Man Manual years after publication and use it to commit an act of violence. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding the publisher of the book Hit Man enjoyed no First Amendment protection in a wrongful death suit where the book was used to assist and instruct murderers in soliciting, preparing for, and committing murders). Furthermore, the internet has the additional benefit of also making counter-speech more accessible than ever. Individuals can respond directly to provocative or inciting material and, because of the nature of internet searching these responses, have a good chance of being seen in conjunction with the initial speech. If it is true that speech doctrines like fighting words and incitement "are of very limited relevance to the Internet," perhaps that is an argument for the abolition of these exceptions rather than an argument for their expansion. 341 Obama, supra note 16. 342 Indeed, some have suggested that speech arousing extreme emotion is highly conducive to free discourse. As Justice Douglas argued in his dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, "Emotions sway speakers and audiences alike. Intemperate speech is a distinctive characteristic of man. Hot-heads blow off and release destructive energy in the process. They shout and rave, exaggerating weaknesses, magnifying error, viewing with alarm." 343 U.S. 250, 286-87 (1952) cannot be furthered by allowing such provocative speech. 351 But such criticisms miss the mark for a few reasons. 352 First, allowing such speech even in the face of potential violence sends a message about the robust nature and durability of the marketplace. 353 Second, the attacks spurned discussion both within Islam and elsewhere as to the proper response to offensive speech. 354 Third, violent reactions serve as confirmation of the message of the cartoons that Islam has become far too intolerant of criticism and therefore serve to move society towards truth. 355 Fourth, protecting provocative religious speech is vital for encouraging debate within Islam about the faith. 356 The marketplace of ideas is not a "dated, pre-Internet covenant[]" 357 as some have argued, but a vibrant and increasingly needed force. As the Supreme Court recently affirmed, "[t]he response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth."
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V. CONCLUSION
Provocative speech, such as the publication of images of the Prophet Muhammad, deserves full constitutional protection. Unlike other types of unprotected speech, any attempts to proscribe such speech would focus not on the intrinsic quality of the speech, but on the reactions of third-parties to the speech. Such an approach would invariably create a terrorist's veto, which distorts, rather than furthers, the marketplace of ideas. The Danish cartoons, and other provocative images of the Prophet Muhammad discussed in this article, were not intended to cause violence, but to evoke a global conversation on religious tolerance and freedom of expression. Those who respond with threats and acts of violence do a disservice to the free flow of ideas in a globalized world. It would be inappropriate to allow those who take offense to certain, perhaps unpopular, forms of expression to exercise a terrorist's veto that effectively circumvents and diminishes this vital debate.
